The Trump Effect: How Coercion May Strengthen BRICS

The US president’s aggressive use of tariffs and sanctions against trading partners may have an unintended consequence: it could strengthen the incentives that made BRICS attractive in the first place. For years, Washington has made no secret of its disdain for the BRICS bloc, using tariffs aggressively to punish countries that align themselves with what he calls “anti-American policies.” Last year, Trump threatened a 10 percent tariff on any country joining BRICS, sending shockwaves through global markets.

Washington’s economic might is being met with resistance. The more it uses coercion, the more reason other countries have to reduce their exposure to US power. Despite not sharing a common ideology or security policy, the BRICS bloc’s members – Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the UAE – are increasingly united in their desire to diminish dependence on the US financial system.

The dollar’s centrality gives the US enormous structural advantages. International transactions pass through financial institutions subject to US jurisdiction; access to US markets can be restricted; sanctions can isolate governments and companies from parts of the global financial system. However, this dependence carries risks for countries outside the Western core, particularly in times of economic uncertainty or geopolitical tension.

Recent events have highlighted these risks. The scrutiny of Brazil’s Pix instant-payment system by the US administration is a case in point. By penalizing countries that rely on alternative payment systems, Washington demonstrates its willingness to use economic coercion as a tool of foreign policy.

However, this may backfire. As BRICS continues to experiment with reducing dependence on the dollar and Western-dominated financial infrastructure, it’s clear that the US is inadvertently strengthening the incentives for countries to cooperate economically. Protection against vulnerability to US power is becoming a common reason for countries with otherwise divergent interests to come together.

The New Development Bank, established by the original BRICS countries as an alternative source of development finance, offers a prime example. Its current strategy targets 30 percent of financing in local currencies, partly to reduce borrowers’ exposure to foreign-exchange risks and costly currency swaps. This is not a rival global financial system but rather a gradual construction of options that allow governments and businesses to conduct transactions without relying on the dollar.

Countries are building alternatives to reduce their exposure to US power, and Trump’s policies have given this process additional urgency. The sanctions against Russia and Iran have pushed them towards alternative payment and trading arrangements precisely because their access to Western financial networks has been restricted.

It’s not about whether BRICS can challenge the dollar’s dominance; it’s about countries seeking options beyond US-centric economic infrastructure. According to the International Monetary Fund, the dollar accounted for 57.1 percent of global foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026 – a share that rose slightly during the quarter.

In this context, Trump’s hostility towards BRICS may have an ironic consequence: it could strengthen the very incentives that made the bloc attractive to begin with. The question is not whether Washington will succeed in weakening BRICS; it’s how far its policies will drive countries to seek alternatives to US power. One thing is certain: the more Washington uses coercion, the more reason there is for countries to reduce their dependence on the dollar and Western-dominated financial infrastructure.

The clock is ticking, but for whom?